Memory for visible speech sounds

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12:15-12:25 (536)

Influence of Lipreading on Detection of Speech in Signal-Correlated Noise. BRUNO H. REPP, *Haskins Laboratories*, & RAM FROST, *Hebrew University of Jerusalem*—Simultaneous presentation of matching visual information (the speaker's face) does not improve the detectability of spoken disyllabic words in signal-correlated noise. However, it has a strong influence on subjects' tendency to say "yes." Subjects thus register the correspondence between the visual information and the amplitude envelope of the masking noise. Frost et al. (JML, 1988) obtained the same result with printed rather than lipread words, but found a much smaller effect with printed nonwords. We report results from a second experiment using lipread (visemic) nonwords.

12:30-12:40 (537)

Memory for Visible Speech Sounds. BEATRICE DE GELDER & JEAN VROOMEN, *Tilburg University* (sponsored by Paul Bertelson)—Memory for spoken syllable lists presented either auditorily, visually, or bimodally, showed a recency effect, whether list items differ in consonants or in vowel, but not when the list items rhyme. Suffix effects are strongest when presentation modality of list and suffix are matched. These findings suggest that two separate stores (a modality specific and a common one) contribute to memory for spoken language.

RECOGNITION/RECALL II
Regency Ballroom D, Sunday Morning, 11:10-1:05

Chaired by Michael Palij, New York University

11:10-11:25 (538)

Memory Permanence Versus Memory Replacement in Sentence Recall. STACY L. BIRCH & WILLIAM F. BREWER, *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign* (read by William F. Brewer)—Subjects recalled sentences known to produce high rates of lexical substitutions (Brewer, 1975, 1977). Subjects then completed fragments of originally studied words and of words frequently substituted for original words. Fragment completion of original items that had been replaced during recall showed no facilitation, whereas fragment completion of correctly recalled items and no-recall items showed facilitation. The data argue against a memory-permanence hypothesis and are consistent with a memory-replacement hypothesis.

11:30-11:50 (539)

Triage III. CHARLES J. BRAINERD, *University of Arizona*—This is the third report to the Society on a counterintuitive relationship between the strengths of words' memory representations and the order in which they are retrieved during unconstrained recall. In the present experiments, interest centered on the relative degrees of control over the triage effect that are exerted by semantic and episodic factors. Surprisingly, triage seemed to be chiefly under episodic control. Although semantic factors affected triage, these effects usually required episodic priming. The subjects were children and adolescents, so developmental trends were also examined.

11:55-12:15 (540)

The List-Strength Effect in Recognition Memory. ANDREW YONELINAS, *University of Toronto*, WILLIAM HOCKLEY, *Wilfrid Laurier University*, & BENNET B. MURDOCK, *University of Toronto* (read by Bennet B. Murdock)—Ratcliff, Clark, and Shiffrin failed to find a list-strength effect in recognition memory, and concluded that this was counter to all current global-matching memory models. We have conducted several experiments using rapid sequential visual presentation and, with a yes–no procedure, clearly do find a list-strength effect.

12:20-12:40 (541)

Age of English Acquisition and the Recognition of English Words. MICHAEL PALIJ & DORIS AARONSON, *New York University*—Previous research (Palij & Aaronson, 1989) has shown that age of English acquisition (AEA) does not affect recall of English words even though SAT verbal scores systematically decrease with increasing AEA. We report an experiment using a forced-choice recognition task with an intervening verbal task based on the SAT. Correct recognition was unrelated to AEA while performance on the verbal task decreased as a function of AEA. We examine some mechanisms for this dissociation.

12:45-1:00 (542)

A Constraint on the Lag Effect in Free Recall: Individual Differences. THOMAS C. TOPPINO, KRISTINE KRAJNAK, & SCOTT SPIELMAN, *Villanova University*—Subjects received a multitrial free-recall task with lists containing some words that were presented twice. First-trial recall of twice-presented items was analyzed as a function of the lag separating repetitions and as a function of whether subjects were categorized as high or low organizers on the basis of an intertrial-repetition measure of their recall protocols. Results indicated that only high organizers exhibited a distributed lag effect. Theoretical implications are considered.

JUDGMENT/DECISION MAKING III
Regency Ballroom H, Sunday Morning, 10:30-1:00

Chaired by Valerie F. Reyna, University of Arizona

10:30-10:50 (543)

Effects of Experience on Preference Reversals in a Context of Uncertainty. CLAUDIA CECILIA GONZALEZ & THOMAS S. WALLSTEN, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill* (read by Thomas S. Wallsten)—Various theories account for preference reversals in which more is bid for a lottery offering a larger outcome, but the lottery providing the higher probability to win is chosen. Two experiments investigate the effects of experience on this phenomenon in a context in which event probabilities can be judged, but are not given precisely. Both predicted and unpredicted reversals decrease with experience at rates modulated by other manipulated variables. Theoretical implications will be discussed.

10:55-11:15 (544)

Social Dilemmas with Uniformly Distributed Resources: The Sequential Paradigm. DAVID V. BUDESCU, *University of Haifa*, AMNON RAPOPORT, & RAMZI SULEIMAN, *University of Arizona*—Most empirical research on social dilemmas has focused on situations where the size of the resource is known to all participants, and all requests are registered simultaneously. In this paper, we describe two experiments in which the size of the resource is a uniformly distributed random variable and the players make their demands sequentially with, or without, information regarding the requests of the previous players. Nash equilibrium solutions are derived and empirically tested.

11:20-11:35 (545)

Reasoning and Judgment Processes in Probability Assessment. P. GEORGE BENSON, SHAWN P. CURLEY, & GERALD F. SMITH, *University of Minnesota* (read by Shawn P. Curley)—When we state probabilities, what information do we convey? The answer is neither obvious nor clearly formulated despite the prevalence of probability language in formal techniques and lay usage. We present a cognitive analysis of probability judgments as arising from belief processing activities. Reasoning, in translating data to conclusions, is highlighted as a critical activity. This argument-centered theory supports better understanding of the assessment literature and has implications for new lines of research.

11:40-11:50 (546)

A Disjunction Fallacy. MAYA BAR-HILLEL, *Hebrew University of Jerusalem*—Formally, a conjunction fallacy and a disjunction fallacy cannot be distinguished. Intuitively, they are different. Furthermore, the pragmatics of disjunctions differ from those of conjunctions. This study demonstrates a disjunction fallacy, analogous to Kahneman and Tversky's conjunction fallacy, and shows how the ranking of options by the order in which one would like to bet on them compares with their ranking by probability. Though normatively these orderings should coincide, they may elicit different demand characteristics.

11:55-12:05 (547)

Correlated Evidence. GEORGE WOLFORD, *Dartmouth College*—Is uncorrelated evidence always preferable to correlated evidence? No, a highly predictive but correlated measure might be preferable to a less predictive, uncorrelated measure. Subjects appear to be aware of this tradeoff.

12:10-12:30 (548)

Experimental Tests of Fundamental Axioms in Value Difference Theory. JOHN M. MIYAMOTO, *University of Washington*, & JAMES W. LUNDELL, *Hewlett-Packard*—Enormous progress has been made over the past 30 years in the axiomatic analysis of models of subjective difference. With the exception of a few, isolated studies, however, the progress has been restricted to mathematical research. We will report